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Abstract 
Euro‑Canadians and Chinese typically hold different theories about change; Euro‑Canadians often engage in lin‑
ear thinking whereas Chinese often engage in non‑linear thinking. The present research investigated the effects of 
culture‑specific theories of change in two related gambling fallacies: the gambler’s fallacy (GF; the belief that one is 
due for a win after a run of losses) and the hot‑hand fallacy (HHF; the belief that one’s winning streak is likely to con‑
tinue). In Study 1, participants predicted the outcome of a coin toss following a sequence of tosses. Study 2 involved 
predicting and betting on the outcome of a basketball player’s shot following a sequence of shots. In Study 1, Asians 
(mainly Chinese) were significantly more likely than Euro‑Canadians to believe that they would win (correctly predict 
the coin toss) after a series of losses (a non‑linear thinking pattern), suggesting greater susceptibility to the gambler’s 
fallacy. In Study 2, Euro‑Canadians were more likely than Chinese to predict outcomes consistent with a basketball 
player’s streaks (a linear thinking pattern), suggesting greater susceptibility to the hot hand fallacy. By illustrating the 
role of cultural differences in cognition, these findings contribute to our understanding of why certain cultural groups, 
such as Chinese, are more susceptible to gambling.
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Background
“The only sure thing about luck is that it will change”. 
– Bret Harte
Imagine yourself standing at a slot machine, pulling 
the lever and holding your breath as the cartoons spin 
in front of you, hoping that luck will come through and 
that you will get three identical pictures in a row. The 
pictures stop spinning and you realize that you have lost 
the round, as well as the money you just paid to play. You 
decide to try again, and you lose once again. Before you 
know it, you have played ten rounds without any success. 
Would you keep playing the game after your series of 
losses? What thoughts or underlying beliefs would moti-
vate your decision to continue or discontinue gambling? 
Would your justification to continue to play revolve 
around the idea that your luck is likely to change for the 
better? Or would you give up gambling because you are 
feeling like you are having a ‘bad luck day?’ The present 
research seeks to understand underlying cognitions that 
may influence patterns of gambling behavior.
Gambling is a common practice in the United States 
and Canada. Out of 10, 765 American college students 
surveyed, 42 % had gambled in the past year with 2.6 % 
gambling weekly or more (LaBrie et al. 2003). The prev-
alence rate of gambling in Canada in 2006–2007 was 
70.7 % (Wood and Williams 2009), with 61.35 % of youth 
(aged 15–24) indicating that they had gambled in the past 
year (Huang and Boyer 2007). The high incidence of gam-
bling reflects its status as a common pastime for North 
Americans and suggests that gambling behavior is an 
important area of research.
So far, most studies in the gambling literature have 
examined prevalence and gambling motivation within 
Western populations. Among ethnic Chinese, the preva-
lence of problem gambling—defined as a range of gam-
bling issues that influence gamblers’ daily lives, but 
are not yet at a clinical, or pathological level (Loo et  al. 
2008)—varies geographically, and although cross-cultural 
research in gambling prevalence has yielded some incon-
sistent findings (e.g., Loo et  al. 2008), there is evidence 
that Chinese communities outside of China tend to have 
greater incidences of problem gambling than the general 
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population. For example, in the United States, Asian 
students had higher estimated gambling rates (12.5  %) 
than several other cultural groups (Caucasians, African, 
Americans, Aboriginal Americans, whose rates were 
4–5  %; Lesieur et  al. 1991). Similarly, rates of problem 
gambling were higher in the Chinese-Australian commu-
nity (Oei et al. 2008, estimated 2.1 %) compared to other 
cultural communities in Australia (e.g., 1.3  % in Cauca-
sian–Australians; Oei et  al. 2008; Victoria Casino and 
Gaming Authority 2000). A study in Canada produced 
similar results, with a problem gambling prevalence of 
3.0 % in Quebec’s Chinese community compared to the 
general provincial rate of 2.6 % (CFSGM 1997). Overall, a 
meta-analysis of 25 studies that examined cross-cultural 
incidence of gambling behavior found that the problem 
gambling rate in Chinese communities across the world 
range from 2.5 to 4.0 % on average (Loo et al. 2008). This 
trend is consistent with findings that identifying as a 
minority may increase one’s chance of developing prob-
lem gambling behavior (Abbott and Volberg 1994).
The greater incidence of problematic gambling in 
Asian cultural groups (especially Chinese) generates the 
following question: What are the cultural variables that 
are likely to influence gambling behaviors? Much of the 
cross-cultural gambling literature points to the influ-
ence of sociocultural and familial variables. Historical, 
traditional, and social influences (such as the popularity 
of dice and card games throughout history in China, or 
gambling as a central feature in social events and festi-
vals) may be keys to cultural-specific perceptions that 
gambling is a normal and approvable lifestyle choice 
(Clark et al. 1990; Victoria Casino and Gaming Author-
ity 2000; Loo et  al. 2008). For example, problem gam-
bling behaviors are related to parental gambling (Raylu 
and Oei 2004; Wynne et al. 1996; Clarke 2004), having a 
strong Chinese ethnic identity (Lai 2006), acculturative 
stress (Raylu and Oei 2004; Lee et  al. 2007a, b; Jacoby 
et  al. 2013), and limited access to services (Lai 2006). 
In contrast, there is a dearth of cross-cultural gambling 
research focusing on the underlying cognitive factors for 
gambling; the present research seeks to enrich the litera-
ture by addressing this gap.
The need to investigate cognitive factors underlying 
gambling is important because motivational factors are 
limited in accounting for persistent gambling in light of 
losses. Although there are external factors (e.g., mone-
tary gains) and internal factors (e.g., amusement seeking; 
Back et al. 2011; Lee et al. 2007a, b) motivating gambling, 
non-recreational gamblers continue to gamble even 
in  situations where they consistently lose money. What 
perpetuates gambling when external motivators, such as 
monetary gain, are not realized?
To date, there are a number of theories that address 
this question. Of particular interest in the present study 
are the gambler’s and the hot hand fallacies. The gam-
bler’s fallacy is the belief that a successful outcome is due 
after a run of bad luck, or more generally, the belief that 
a series of independent trials with the same outcome will 
soon be followed by an opposite outcome [labelled “nega-
tive serial dependency” by Goodie and Fortune (2013), 
Boynton (2003), Burns and Corpus (2004)]. For example, 
in a fair coin toss, if one gets 4 heads in a row and believes 
in the gambler’s fallacy, one may expect that a tail is due. 
This fallacy may explain why addicted gamblers (and lot-
tery ticket consumers) keep gambling despite a series of 
losses. In contrast to the gambler’s fallacy, the hot hand 
fallacy is the belief that a successful outcome will follow 
a run of success (Gilovich et  al. 1985; Croson and Sun-
dali 2005; also see Xu and Harvey 2014; Xue et al. 2012). 
This theory pertains to the belief that a winning streak is 
likely to continue. For example, if a person has success-
fully scored several basketball shots in a row, or guessed 
the outcomes of numerous coin tosses correctly, he or 
she may be considered “hot” and be expected to continue 
to succeed in making shots or guessing outcomes. In situ-
ations where each trial is independent (e.g., as in Roulette 
and many other common casino games), the gambler’s 
and hot hand fallacies lead to misjudging the likelihood 
of success (Goodie and Fortune 2013). These cognitive 
distortions may contribute to problem gambling: engag-
ing in the gambler’s and hot hand fallacies have both 
been strongly associated with problem gambling (Goodie 
and Fortune 2013).
Research examining cross-cultural differences in gam-
bling fallacies may provide helpful insights into our 
understanding of gambling behaviors across different 
cultural or ethnicity groups. Fong et al. (2014) examined 
Chinese gamblers’ betting decision in a Macau casino, 
and found that their positive recency bias—believing that 
the next outcome will be the same as the most recent 
one (Ayton and Fischer 2004)—decreased as streaks 
increased. However, they had data from Chinese gam-
blers only, which does not allow us to draw any cross-
cultural conclusions. Empirical support and anecdotal 
evidence explored by Walker et  al. (2006) showed that 
Chinese gamblers, compared to British gamblers, are 
more likely to gamble to “test their luck” and tend to put 
greater weight on their perceived luck over the probabil-
ity of attaining certain outcomes. Such finding highlights 
the importance of exploring gambling fallacies in cross-
cultural settings.
Another area of research that may provide insight into 
cultural differences in gambling is culturally specific lay 
theories of change (i.e., beliefs of how events develop and 
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change over time; Ji et al. 2001; Ji 2005). For example, to 
Chinese, change typically occurs in a nonlinear—even 
cyclical—fashion; they tend to believe that what goes up 
‘must come down’, or that two people in a bad relation-
ship could become close friends later (Ji et al. 2001). Thus 
positive events are thought to lead to negative events, and 
negative events can lead to positive events. In contrast, 
European North Americans tend to hold a relatively lin-
ear theory of change, that is, a belief in either no change, 
or change only in a linear fashion (e.g., things at rest tend 
to stay at rest; things in motion tend to stay in motion). 
Applied to gambling, these lay theories of change suggest 
that Chinese may be more likely than European North 
Americans to stop gambling during a winning streak, 
because Chinese are more likely to hold cyclical theo-
ries of change whereas North Americans tend to endorse 
linear theories of change. However, belief in change may 
also lead Chinese gamblers to remain hopeful when 
they lose, perhaps increasing the likelihood of continu-
ous gambling despite a losing streak—this could reflect a 
manifestation of the gambler’s fallacy.
As cultural beliefs and values may influence gambling 
behavior at a cognitive level, we seek in the current 
research to understand more about cross-cultural dif-
ferences in gambling cognition, in particular the gam-
bler’s fallacy and the hot hand fallacy, by contrasting 
East Asians (Chinese in particular) and Euro-Canadians. 
Rather than asking participants outright about their gam-
bling and luck-related beliefs, our method of research 
examines patterns in gambling behavior from which we 
extrapolate underlying cognitions. Some researchers 
have shown that tasks perceived to be random or non-
skills based are more likely to generate gambler’s fallacy-
consistent expectations (Myrseth et  al. 2010), whereas 
tasks perceived to be less random are more likely to 
generate hot hand-type expectations (Burns and Corpus 
2004). Therefore we designed a seemingly-random task 
(a coin toss game) to assess the gambler’s fallacy (Study 
1) and a scenario involving a game of skill (basketball) 
to assess the hot hand fallacy (Study 2). Based on differ-
ences in lay theories of change, we predicted that Chinese 
would exhibit a greater tendency than Euro-Canadians to 
believe that their luck during a coin toss would change, 
exhibiting the gambler’s fallacy, as assessed in Study 1. 
We predicted that Euro-Canadians would be more likely 
than Chinese to believe that a basketball player’s winning 
or losing streak would continue, exhibiting the hot hand 
fallacy, as assessed in Study 2.
Results and discussion
Study 1: coin toss
Study 1 investigated cultural differences in the gambler’s 
fallacy using a two-part coin toss game. The game was 
constructed to investigate how participants would pre-
dict future performance in response to patterns of previ-
ous wins and losses. We examined whether the gambler’s 
fallacy could occur after a winning or losing streak and 
whether there were cultural differences in the gambler’s 
fallacy.
Because the study design involved both between par-
ticipant (culture) and within participant (previous out-
come and length of streak) variables, as well as a binomial 
dependent variable (win or loss prediction), a repeated 
measure generalized estimating equations (GEE) was 
appropriate for analyzing the data. So, we conducted a 
2 (culture: Euro-Canadian vs. Asian) × 2 (previous out-
come: win or loss) × 2 (length of streak: 3 or 6) GEE anal-
ysis on participants’ predicted outcomes, with culture 
as the independent variable and previous outcome and 
length of streak as within participant factors. This anal-
ysis allows us to examine the omnibus main effects and 
interaction effects (see raw frequencies in Table 1).
A GEE analysis indicated that there was a significant 
main effect of previous outcome: participants in gen-
eral were more likely to believe that they would win 
after a series of wins than after a series of losses, wald 
X2(1)  =  14.42, p  <  0.001, odds ratio  =  1.48. This main 
effect was qualified by a significant two-way interac-
tion between Culture and Previous Outcome, wald 
X2(1) =  4.46, p =  0.035, odds ratio =  0.73. Specifically, 
Euro-Canadians believed that they would be more likely 
to win after a series of wins than after a series of losses, 
wald X2(1) = 14.42, p < 0.001, odds ratio = 1.48, whereas 
Asians predicted almost equal chances for a win or loss 
after streaks of wins, as after streaks of losses, wald 
X2(1) = 0.48, p = 0.49, odds ratio = 1.08. In other words, 
Asians were more likely than Euro-Canadians to predict a 
win after a series of losses, and predict a loss after a series 
Table 1 Number of participants in Study 1 who predicted a win or loss after a streak of wins or losses (with percentages 
in brackets)
Prediction After 3 losses After 6 losses After 3 wins After 6 wins
Win Loss Win Loss Win Loss Win Loss
Caucasian 21 (51.2 %) 20 (48.8 %) 13 (31.7 %) 28 (68.3 %) 26 (63.4 %) 15 (36.6 %) 29 (70.7 %) 12 (29.3 %)
Asian 28 (70 %) 12 (30 %) 21 (52.5 %) 19 (47.5 %) 20 (50 %) 20 (50 %) 24 (60 %) 16 (40 %)
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of wins. In addition, there was a marginally significant 
two-way interaction between Outcome and Length of 
Streak, wald X2(1) = 3.36, p = 0.067, odds ratio = 0.77, 
such that longer streaks increased the belief that a trend 
would continue. No other effect approached significance, 
wald X2(1)s < 1.05, ps > 0.30.
Participants indicated their confidence on a rating scale 
from 1 to 7, thus confidence was a continuous (instead 
of binomial) variable. As a result, a repeated measure 
ANOVA was appropriate for data analysis. Confidence 
was analyzed with a 2 (culture) ×  2 (previous outcome: 
wins or losses) ×  2 (length of streaks: 3 or 6) repeated 
measures ANOVA, with culture being a between subjects 
variable and the latter two variables being within subject 
variables. The analyses revealed a significant main effect 
of previous outcome on confidence: participants in gen-
eral were  more confident after a winning streak (esti-
mated mean = 4.52, SE = 0.13) than after a losing streak 
(estimated mean =  3.97, SE =  0.15), F (1, 79) =  19.72, 
p  <  0.001, partial η2 =  0.20. They were also  more con-
fident after a long streak (estimated mean  =  4.37, 
SE  =  0.15) than after a short streak (estimated 
mean = 4.13, SE = 0.13), F (1, 79) = 4.69, p = 0.033, par-
tial η2 = 0.06. In addition, there was a trend that Asians 
(estimated M  =  4.47, SE  =  0.18) were more confident 
than Canadians (estimated M  =  4.02, SE  =  0.18), F (1, 
79) = 3.12, p = 0.081, partial η2 = 0.04. No other effect 
was significant, Fs < 2.17, ps > 0.14.
Study 2: basketball
Study 2 was designed to investigate cultural differences 
between Chinese and Euro-Canadians in the hot hand 
fallacy, the opposite of the gambler’s fallacy, in a non-ran-
dom scenario involving skills: we chose to use scenarios 
involving a basketball player making or missing several 
hoops in a row.
Participants predicted whether the player would score 
or miss their next shot following streaks of hits or misses. 
See raw frequencies in Table  2. Given that participants’ 
prediction was a binomial variable, as in Study 1, we 
conducted a 2 (culture)  ×  2 (previous outcome: hit or 
miss) ×  2 (length of streak: 5 vs. 15) repeated measure 
GEE on participants’ prediction, with the latter two vari-
ables as within participant factors.
The GEE analysis showed a significant main effect 
of Previous Outcome, such that, in general, more par-
ticipants predicted hit in response to a hit streak than 
in response to a miss streak, wald X2 (1)  =  165.518, 
p  <  0.001, odds ratio  =  2.25. This effect, however, was 
qualified by an interaction between culture and pre-
vious outcome, wald X2 (1)  =  3.75, p  =  0.053, odds 
ratio = 0.844. Specifically, Canadians tended to predict a 
hit after a hit streak and a miss after a miss streak, wald 
X2 (1)  =  78.18, p  <  0.001, odds ratio  =  1.98, whereas 
such a tendency was weaker among Chinese, wald X2 
(1) = 55.85, p < 0.001, odds ratio = 1.63. The results indi-
cate that Canadians had a stronger tendency than Chi-
nese to predict outcomes consistent with streaks. In other 
words, Canadians showed a stronger hot hand fallacy 
for winning streaks (as well as a comparable cold hand 
fallacy for misses) than did Chinese. No other effects 
reached significance, wald X2 (1)’s < 2.21, ps > 0.13.
Participants indicated how much money, between 
1 and 100 dollars (or Yuan), they were willing to bet on 
each of their predictions regarding the basketball player’s 
hits or misses. Bets were treated as an indication of par-
ticipants’ confidence in their own predictions. Given that 
different currencies were used in Canada vs. in China, 
we recognize that direct cross-cultural comparisons on 
the bets can be problematic. We caution readers that any 
direct cross-cultural comparisons should be interpreted 
with prudence. Although the currencies can be converted 
based on the exchange rate or big mac index, there is 
no guarantee of their psychological equivalence across 
cultures. Thus we decided to use the original amount 
reported by participants as the dependent variable, and 
examined confidence within each culture separately. 
Given that bets are measured as continuous variables, 
we conducted a 2 (previous outcome: hit or miss)  ×  2 
(length of streak: 5 or 15) repeated measures ANOVA 
within each culture separately. On average, Chinese bet 
50.03 yuan (SE = 2.00), and Canadians bet 39.35 dollars 
(SE  =  2.73). Results from two separate repeated meas-
ure ANOVAs showed similar patterns of results across 
the two culture groups. First, both Canadian and Chi-
nese participants bet more money after hitting streaks 
than after missing streaks. The estimated means for 
Canadians were 44.37 (SE = 3.01) for the hitting streaks 
Table 2 Number of participants in Study 2 who predicted a hit or miss after a streak of hits or misses (with percentages 
in brackets)
Prediction After 5 misses After 15 misses After 5 hits After 15 hits
Hit Miss Hit Miss Hit Miss Hit Miss
Caucasian 11 (17.5 %) 52 (82.5 %) 5 (7.9 %) 58 (92.1 %) 54 (85.7 %) 9 (14.3 %) 56 (88.9 %) 7 (11.1 %)
Asian 25 (25 %) 75 (75 %) 21 (21 %) 79 (79 %) 74 (74 %) 26 (26 %) 85 (85 %) 15 (15 %)
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and 34.32 (SE  =  3.12) for the missing streaks, F (1, 
62) = 12.94, p = 0.001, partial η2 = 0.173. The estimated 
means for Chinese were 55.66 (SE = 2.05) for the hitting 
streaks and 44.40 (SE =  2.66) for the missing streaks, F 
(1, 99)  =  19.14, p  <  0.001, partial η2  =  0.162. In addi-
tion, participants in general bet more money for a longer 
streak (15 consecutive hits or misses) than for a shorter 
streak (5 consecutive hits or misses). The estimated 
means for Canadians were 47.81 (SE = 3.41) for the long 
streaks and 30.88 (SE = 2.68) for the short streaks, F (1, 
62) = 36.91, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.373. The estimated 
means for Chinese were 55.03 (SE =  2.35) for the long 
streaks and 45.03 (SE = 1.89) for the short streaks, F (1, 
99) =  44.92, p  <  0.001, partial η2 =  0.312. The interac-
tion between previous outcome and length of streak, 
however, was significant among Chinese, F (1, 99) = 9.23, 
p = 0.003, partial η2 = 0.085, but not among Canadians, 
F (1, 62) = 0.07, p > 0.78. Specifically, Chinese tendency 
of betting more after hitting than after missing streaks 
was stronger for the long streaks, F (1, 99)  =  24.25, 
p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.197, than for the short streaks, F 
(1, 99) = 6.40, p = 0.013, partial η2 = 0.061.
General discussion
Results from Study 1 showed that Asians were less likely 
than Euro-Canadians to predict that gambling outcomes 
would continue linearly. In other words, Asians were 
more likely than Euro-Canadians to believe that their 
luck would change during the next round. Asians’ greater 
tendency to predict a win after a streak of losses indicates 
that they were more susceptible to the gambler’s fallacy 
than were Euro-Canadians. In Study 2, likewise, Euro-
Canadians were more likely than Chinese to believe that 
a streak of success or failures would continue in the same 
vein. This indicates that Canadians were more susceptible 
to the hot hand fallacy (and its “Cold Hand” Fallacy coun-
terpart for losing scenarios) than were Chinese. Thus we 
have obtained consistent results in terms of cultural dif-
ferences in gambling fallacies in both random tasks (coin-
toss) and nonrandom tasks involving skills (basketball).
Because losing (or failure) occurs more often than win-
ning (or success) in gambling, this means that Chinese 
gamblers who are losing may be less likely to believe their 
losing streak will continue, and may gamble longer and 
more sums of money than would Euro-Canadian gam-
blers, which may contribute to the higher prevalence of 
problem gambling in the Chinese population. The results 
also support previous research on lay theories of change: 
Chinese are less likely than Euro-Canadians to make lin-
ear predictions (Ji 2005). The findings are consistent with 
past research (Ji et al. 2008), which has shown that, in the 
context of stock price prediction and decisions, Chinese 
demonstrated the gambler’s fallacy beliefs more and the 
hot hand beliefs less than did Canadians.
Whereas past work has examined situational and indi-
vidual difference variables influencing gambling fallacies 
(e.g., Barron and Leider 2010; Roney and Trick 2003), the 
present research highlights how cultural variables—cul-
tural worldviews of change—may play an important role 
in gambling fallacies (Raylu and Oei 2004). Such find-
ings have implications for gambling behaviors in general. 
Future research should further unpack the culture vari-
ables and investigate which aspects of culture are respon-
sible for the observed cultural differences.
The present research presents a few limitations. First, 
the Euro-Canadian sample included mainly women. 
There is evidence, albeit contradictory, that gender 
influences rates of problem gambling and endorsement 
of gambling fallacies. For example, Seutens and Tyran 
(2012) found that men were more susceptible to the gam-
bler’s fallacy than women, whereas Dohmen et al. (2009) 
found that men were more likely than women to demon-
strate the understanding that a series of chance events 
are independent. In their systematic review of gambling 
among Chinese participants, Loo et  al. (2008) found 
that men were at a higher risk of problem gambling than 
women, yet women experienced worse outcomes of 
problem gambling. Finally, Fong et al. (2014) did not find 
an effect of gender on gambling fallacies. The unbalanced 
gender ratios in the present research, unfortunately, does 
not allow for a meaningful examination of gender effect. 
Future studies may focus on how culture and gender 
interact to influence the endorsement of the gambler’s 
and the hot hand fallacies.
Second, all participants were university students. 
Past research suggests that university students in North 
America have a higher prevalence of problem gambling 
(Blinn-Pike et al. 2007) and are more likely to endorse the 
gambler’s fallacy (Marmurek et  al. 2014) than members 
of the general community (e.g., adolescents or adults not 
in college or university). More research is needed to first 
investigate whether this phenomenon is present cross-
culturally, and secondly, to extend our findings to adults 
not in university.
Third, we did not include direct measures of cultural 
values and thinking processes (such as lay theories of 
change). Future research should include bigger and more 
balanced samples, and add qualitative measures about 
cultural beliefs and values so that we can better under-
stand the factors responsible for gambling behavior 
across cultures. Additionally, it would be useful to com-
plete follow-up studies to better examine behaviors seen 
in actual gambling environments such as casinos.
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The present findings have practical implications for 
gambling education outreach programs as well as poten-
tial treatment avenues. Current treatment programs 
are not especially equipped to take culture into consid-
eration when designing treatment plans (Raylu and Oei 
2002). With this in mind, it may be useful for gambling 
intervention programs to place an emphasis on educat-
ing clients about underlying cultural beliefs influencing 
gambling fallacies (such as the gambler’s fallacy and the 
hot hand fallacy), and how these can affect their percep-
tions of future outcomes. Past research has found that 
education about mathematical probability in gambling 
was useful in decreasing the likelihood that participants 
succumb to gambling fallacies (Williams and Connolly 
2006); perhaps education about trends and probabilities 
of trend reversals may be useful for gambling education 
for certain treatment groups.
Conclusions
Overall, the present research has shown that cultural 
groups experience gambling fallacies differently—Asians 
are more subject to the gambler’s fallacy and less sub-
ject to the hot-hand fallacy than Euro-Canadians, and 
that these differences are likely influenced by underlying 
cognitive beliefs that vary across cultures. These findings 
are an important step in identifying why certain cultural 
groups, such as Chinese, are more susceptible to gam-
bling. Future research with problem gambling popula-
tions is recommended in order to further develop our 
understanding of the effects of culture and cognition on 
gambling behaviors.
Methods
Study 1: coin toss
Participants
We aimed at getting 40–60 participants from each 
culture group, and recruited 81 participants from a 
Canadian university, including 41 Euro-Canadian par-
ticipants (31 women and 10 men) ranging from 17 to 
20 years of age, mean = 18, and 40 Asian participants (30 
women and 10 men) ranging from 18 to 22 years of age, 
mean = 19. The majority of them were Chinese or Chi-
nese Canadians (n =  37) with 2 Korean Canadians and 
1 Japanese Canadian. All participants received course 
credit for their participation.
Materials and procedure
We used Medialab™ version 2010 to program the game. 
Unsuspecting participants were told that they would be 
participating in a virtual coin toss guessing game where 
the coin tosses were randomized by the computer. They 
were also told that the chances of tossing heads or tails 
on the computer were the same as they would have been 
in real life. But in truth, each coin toss sequence was pro-
grammed ahead of time to ensure that all participants 
would encounter the same coin toss sequences.
The game presented participants with a virtual coin and 
asked them to predict whether it would land on heads or 
tails. After participants made each prediction, a virtual 
coin was tossed and the program reported whether they 
won or lost the toss (i.e., correct versus incorrect in their 
prediction). There were eight series of coin tosses, each 
involving three or six guesses each. The computer pro-
gram predetermined the series of wins or losses, without 
participants’ knowledge. As a result, in four of the experi-
mental series, each participant got three or six wins or 
losses in a row, whereas the other four series acted as 
filler items with a mix of wins and losses to disguise the 
true nature of the experiment. At the end of each series 
after learning about the previous outcomes, the com-
puter asked participants whether they thought their next 
prediction would be correct or incorrect if they were to 
toss another coin. This prediction served as the main 
dependent variable. A correct prediction meant a win 
and an incorrect prediction meant a loss. After making 
a prediction, they indicated how confident they were on 




Participants were recruited from a Canadian university 
as well as a university from central China. The sample 
consisted of 63 Euro-Canadian participants (57 women 
and 6 men) and 100 Chinese participants (52 women and 
48 men). Euro-Canadians ranged from 17 to 23 years old, 
M  =  18.19 while Chinese participants ranged from 16 
to 22  years of age, M =  19.12. All participants received 
course credit for their participation.
Materials and procedure
Participants completed a questionnaire about sports 
gambling, which contained six scenarios describing how 
many shots a basketball player had made or missed. 
Among the six scenarios, four were test items and two 
were filler items. The test items involved a player miss-
ing or making consecutive shots (either 5 or 15 times in 
a row). For example, “A basketball player has made 15 
shots in a row without missing in a game (or has missed 
15 shots in a row in a game)”. The filler items involved a 
player’s performance with a mix of hits and misses (e.g., 
“A basketball player has made 10 shots and 10 misses in 
the past 20 shots in a game”). The gender of the player in 
the scenario was not specified. After each scenario, par-
ticipants were asked to predict if the player would score 
or miss their next shot. They were also asked to indicate 
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the amount of money, between $1 and $100 (or yuan for 
Chinese participants), they would bet on their prediction 
of score or miss. The question implied that the money 
was their own, but the bets were hypothetical. The mon-
etary bet was used as an indicator of confidence. Lastly, 
participants answered demographics questions, includ-
ing gender, age, year of studies and ethnicity. The order of 
the six basketball scenarios were randomized across par-
ticipants, resulting in three versions of the questionnaire. 
(Note: there were no order effects, p > 0.129.)
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